Jules Develle and the Paknam Incident of 1893

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Abstract
This contribution analyses the role of the French Foreign Minister Jules Develle with regard to the Franco-Siamese Crisis of 1893. The main body of the text addresses the extent to which Jules Develle directed French foreign policy during the Siamese Crisis of 1893. The paper assumes that although Develle officially held the power, his decision-making in the Siamese crisis was substantially influenced by other actors. The purpose of this paper is to identify who these actors were and the extent to which they were able to persuade the Foreign Minister to adopt their views or aims with respect to the Siam question.

Keywords
Jules Develle | French foreign policy | Siam | Paknam

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INTRODUCTION

Siam, as modern Thailand used to be called, was an object of interest of Western powers from the 17th century. The Siamese monarchs were very resistant to any attempts by Europeans to penetrate the country, and although the powers intensified their efforts during the 19th century, Siam was, as the sole state in the region of the Southeast Asia, able to preserve its sovereignty and independence. However, it had to pay a price for its survival.

The reasons for the clash of interests of France and Great Britain in Siam have already been examined by several scholars. As far as the Anglo-French diplomatic rivalry is concerned, there are excellent studies by Chandran Jeshurun and Nigel Brailey. Throughout the 1880s, the question of the control of the Mekong became a cornerstone of this rivalry. According to the French historian Nelly Didelot, the revival of interest in this period was caused by three factors: the revival of the colonial movement in France, fear of eventual British dominance and control of the Upper Mekong, and finally, the need to define the boundaries between French Indochina (Annam-Tonkin), Siam, and Yunnan. Franco-Siamese relations were then marred by the French advance towards Siam, which later culminated in the Paknam Incident.


2 Jeshurun’s study mainly represents the British point of view. It is based mostly on the private correspondence of British statesmen, including the Rosebery, Salisbury, Gladstone, Harcourt, Curzon, and Dufferin papers. From the French archives, the author studied the official papers of Delcassé and of Hanotaux, but he neglected the private correspondence of Delcassé, which is the most valuable resource. He also completely omitted the papers of Jules Develle, Auguste Pavie, and Paul Révoil. Instead, he relied on Documents Diplomatique Français. In his monograph, Jeshurun paid considerable attention to the Far Eastern Policy of Lord Salisbury in particular. Chandran Jeshurun, The Contest for Siam, 1889–1902: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1977); Nigel J. Brailey, Imperial Amnesia: Britain, France and the “Question of Siam” (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing, 2009); Nigel J. Brailey, “Anglo-French Rivalry over Siam and the Treaties of April 1904,” in The Anglo-French Relations, 1898–1904: From Fashoda to Jospin, ed. Philippe Chassaigne and Michael Dockrill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 56–68.


During 1893, the Quai d’Orsay was headed by Jules Develle, who has not been the subject of scholarly studies so far. In fact, there is not a single study that has addressed his role in the Siamese question. Develle is difficult to assess because there is almost none of his correspondence left at the Archive du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères and the content of the Develle family estate in Archives départementales de la Meuse is not extensive. Hence, it is not surprising that no scholarly monograph has been published on him so far. However, Develle can be assessed from other sources, via his contemporaries.

The aim of this study, despite the lack of data, is to examine the role of Jules Develle with regard to the Franco-Siamese Crisis of 1893. The research assumes that an inexperienced Foreign Minister whose professional focus was far from the domain of foreign affairs had to rely more heavily on his advisers. The first part of the study seeks to identify the competencies of the Foreign Minister and to examine to what extent he himself could determine the direction of French foreign policy. It also asks who else could have influenced its direction and to what extent. The second part of the paper examines the question of how the Paknam Incident evolved and tries to identify the contributions of Develle and of those who might have influenced him during the crisis and diplomatic maneuvers. The study understands the Siamese crisis as the development of events from February to October 1893. The research is based primarily on unpublished archival sources of British and French provenience, both of an institutional and a private character, with an emphasis on the private collections of the individual actors.

THE QUAI D’ORSAY AND THE FORMULATION OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

The formulation of French foreign policy at the end of the 19th century was a complicated matter involving many actors. The republican constitution attributed the domain of foreign policy to the President, whose prerogatives includ-
ed the negotiation and ratification of treaties. In most cases, he could not act independently, but in certain situations he “retain[ed] considerable freedom of action.” The fact that he could not act independently of the Cabinet and Assembly limited his role in the formulation of foreign policy.

The central organ was the Cabinet, which was presided over by the Premier. Cabinet met once a week in secret sessions of which no minutes were kept. In January 1893, in the government of Alexandre Ribot, the Cabinet consisted of ten ministers (interior; justice; foreign affairs; finance; war; navy; public instruction, art, and cults; public works; agriculture; and commerce, industry, and colonies). There was another member who was permitted to attend the conseil but was unable to vote—the Colonial Undersecretary, Théophile Delcassé.

The government’s foreign policy was the responsibility of ministers individually or of the Cabinet collectively. Within the Cabinet the central figure in charge of the foreign agenda was the Foreign Minister. Even though the other members of the Cabinet could be heard when issues relevant to their agendas were involved, his voice was the most important and he usually enjoyed a relatively free hand. The Cabinet was supposed to be consulted on international issues, but was often rather “held in relative ignorance of foreign affairs.” For example, during his tenure in 1898–1905, Delcassé usually did not consult the Cabinet on foreign policy issues, instead listening to Paul Cambon, Camille Barrère, and others. Whoever he consulted, though, he always held the decision-making power.

What further enhanced the exclusive position of the Foreign Minister was the attitude of the Prime Minister. It was not exceptional for the Prime Minister to be indifferent to foreign affairs and entrust their management exclusively to the Quai d’Orsay. The Foreign Minister was supposed to be an expert on matters of foreign policy, but this was not the rule in the history of the Third Republic. The position of an amateur minister was difficult, as he was vulnerable to significant influence from his colleagues or permanent employees of the Quai.

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8 He was supposed to inform the Assembly about the substance of those treaties and in some cases needed its consent. Schuman, *War and Diplomacy*, 12.
10 Ibid., 32.
17 Ibid., 30.
The Foreign Minister had a wide apparatus of experts at his disposal in his ministerial department.\(^{18}\) His most important advisor was usually the Political Director, often a former career diplomat and a foreign affairs expert.\(^{19}\) When a Foreign Minister was inexperienced or too busy with parliamentary affairs, the Political Director was left in charge of the foreign agenda.\(^{20}\) In 1893, the position was held by Armand Nissard, who was recognized as the diplomat “who knows the most about international issues.”\(^{21}\)

In addition, there were career diplomats and consuls. The French ambassadors were appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Quai d’Orsay. In 1893, France had ten ambassadors who, along with plenipotentiary ministers and consuls, often “assume[d] a large measure of independence” and “frequently conducted personal diplomacy and disobeyed instructions.”\(^{22}\) This was later confirmed in the cases of Paul Cambon or Maurice Paléologue,\(^{23}\) and it was probably also true of Auguste Pavie in Bangkok.

The general foreign policy of the Cabinet was controlled by the legislature. Parliament, however, was not usually involved in setting foreign policy “because most parliamentarians and their constituents were interested primarily in domestic politics.”\(^{24}\) Delcassé complained in 1882 of the Chamber of Deputies’ complete lack of interest in foreign affairs.\(^{25}\) As Patrick Tuck observed, “parliamentary opinion on external matters was notoriously volatile, [and therefore] the pre-war governments of the Third Republic tended to withhold awkward foreign policy issues from parliamentary discussion.”\(^{26}\) There were also the Chamber Commissions on Foreign Affairs (one in the Senate and one in the Assembly). As their main task was “to control the general foreign policy of the Cabinet,” they met regularly, sometimes in joint session with other relevant parliamentary commissions, and published their reports in supplements to the *Journal Officiel*.\(^{27}\)

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\(^{18}\) Each ministerial department had its *chef* and consisted of several bodies. See *Annuaire*, 1.


\(^{21}\) France Archives, Archives diplomatiques, Inventaire 182FPAP, Available at https://francearchives.fr/findingaid/bdf08fdded3b9d42c8e24b186d70db42fddff94a (accessed May 3, 2022); *Annuaire*, 3.

\(^{22}\) Hayne, *French Foreign*, 12, 25.


\(^{24}\) Hayne, *French Foreign*, 36.

\(^{25}\) Archive du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris (hereafter AMAE), Papiers d’agents, Archive Privé, fond Théophile Delcassé, Tome 26, Correspondance privée (hereafter PAAP211/26), Delcassé to Mme Massip (later Mme Delcassé), s. l., July (1886), 12.

\(^{26}\) Tuck, *French Wolf*, 101.

\(^{27}\) Schuman, *War and Diplomacy*, 383–84.
External influences also shaped foreign policy-making. The instability of governments, a chronic problem of the Third Republic, played to the advantage of the officials, the press, big business, and the Parliament, ultimately resulting in limitations on the independence of the Quai d’Orsay. Finally, the role of the French colonial lobby should not be omitted. Leading the way was the parti colonial, a movement that promoted colonial expansion and called for a firm policy towards Siam. The parti “relie[d] on the numerous personal links between its members and the decision-makers of the Quai d’Orsay and the Colonial Department, as well as on the position of its members in the institutional machinery of the State, notably in the budget committee.”

As well as these groups, by the late 19th century, the press and public opinion had emerged as important factors whose influence over foreign policy should not be neglected. But according to André Nouschi, the foreign policy-making of the time was a matter for the government and those who read the newspapers dealing with colonial affairs were still a minority. However, if members of the French Chamber made up a significant number of this minority, it may have ultimately acted as an important factor and a coercive force. In any case, it is not the aim of this study to discuss this particular aspect in great detail.

It is clear from the above that the decision-making process in French foreign policy was a complex affair. The Foreign Minister could have been influenced both directly and indirectly. Within the Quai d’Orsay, the direct influence lay with his close associates. Alongside Armand Nisard was the Foreign Minister’s chief of staff Paul Révoil, a lawyer who had previously worked for Develle at the Ministry of Agriculture. This future governor general of Morocco was one of

28 Hayne, French Foreign, 29.
30 The parti colonial included “colonial minded individuals and groups, of whom the most important were the groupe colonial in the Chamber (and, from 1898, in the Senate also), the Comité de l’Afrique française and the Union Coloniale Française.” Christopher M. Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy 1898–1905 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1968), 30.
31 Didelot, “Le Maître,” 68.
32 There were also specialized publications, such as Bulletin du Comité de l’Afrique française, but the circulation of the latter never exceeded 5,000. André Nouschi, “L’opinion publique française et les affaires coloniales (1880–1900): contribution au débat sur l’imperialisme,” in Opinio publique, 359–60.
the closest friends of Eugène Étienne, his “âme damnée.” Raymond Poincaré, a compatriot from Bar-le-Duc, also belonged among Develle’s closest associates and supporters at the Quai d’Orsay. Ambassadors may also have influenced Develle; in addition to William Henry Waddington, the French ambassador in London, this was evident in the letters from the French chargé d’affaires in London, Paul-Henri-Benjamin Balluet D’Estournelles, baron de Constant de Rébecque. He wrote to Develle with instructions on what to do and what to tell the British ambassador in Paris, Dufferin. Such rhetoric was highly unusual.

Within the Cabinet, the most important figures relevant to the foreign policy agenda were the Prime Minister, the Minister of War, and the Minister of Marine. During Develle’s tenure, there were two Prime Ministers of France, Alexander Ribot and Charles Dupuy. Ribot was a financial expert who had been interested in foreign policy since he had headed the Quai d’Orsay in 1880. He believed that the core of foreign policy should be European, and he considered an entente with Great Britain essential. Thus, he approved of colonial expansion but only within this context. Dupuy, who had previously served as the Minister of Public Instruction in 1892, was an academic who preferred domestic issues, particularly education. Eventually, there was Delcassé, who had access to all the meetings of the Cabinet and who was a recognized expert on colonial matters. Delcassé could influence Develle through his own direct interventions during Cabinet meetings and in their private consultations, but also indirectly through speeches in the Chamber and via the press, where he had many friends. In the Chamber, a powerful branch of the parti, the groupe colonial led by Étienne, a close friend of both Delcassé and Develle, had a significant impact. Delcassé was thus able to exert pressure on Develle through public opinion, which he helped to mobilize not only through the press but also through the parti and the speeches of its adherents in the Chamber.

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33 Andrew, Théophile, 137. Étienne, a powerful leader of parti colonial and a proponent of colonial expansion, was a friend of Develle too. However, Étienne’s primary interest lay in Africa. Didelot, “Le Maître,” 67.
37 France, Bibliothèque Nationale, Correspondance d’Eugène Étienne, Département des Manuscrits, Nouvelles Acquisitions 24327, Constans to Étienne, s. l., April 22 (1893), f. 24.
DEVELLE AT THE QUAI D’ORSAY

Jules Develle was born in 1845 in Bar-le-Duc in Lorraine, and he started his career as a lawyer to the imperial court of Napoleon III. When the imperial regime fell, he entered the service of the Republic and became a subprefect in Louviers (Eure) in 1872. Four years later he became prefect in Troyes (Aube) but was dismissed after the coup of 16 May 1877. Later in 1877, after winning a by-election, he became a deputy for Louviers. In 1879, he was appointed a State Undersecretary at the Ministry of Interior. By 1893, he had been appointed a Minister of Agriculture three times, hence his field of expertise was rather domestic economic issues.38 When Ribot named him Foreign Minister in January 1893, Develle was 48 years old and had never had to deal with foreign affairs before. According to Pierre Guillen, Ribot decided to keep an eye on issues of the foreign policy during Develle’s tenure.39 But Ribot’s guidance lasted only briefly, because his government fell in the spring. Thereafter, Develle was named Foreign Minister once again by Dupuy and held the post until December 3, 1893.40

The escalation of the crisis in Franco-Siamese relations and the Paknam incident occurred while he was starting his tenure. Since, as an expert on agricultural matters, he had no experience of foreign and colonial policy, it may be assumed that he relied on the advice of the experts he surrounded himself with. According to Tuck, Develle was a politician whose competence in foreign policy matters was questionable to say the least. Tuck further noted that, “he was to be notably passive in managing foreign policy – particularly over the question of Siam – and he was easily impressed by colonialist clamour in the Chamber.”41 According to Didelot, it was the influence of the parti colonial that enabled Delcassé to put Develle under heavy pressure in the spring of 1893, as will be demonstrated later. The question which remains to be answered is whether this was possible because of Develle’s inexperience or lack of interest in foreign issues. While his predecessor Ribot had a clear vision of the direction that French foreign policy should take and what pillars should line this path, Develle’s vision, if

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41 Tuck, French Wolf, 102–3.
he had any, is difficult to construct.\(^{42}\) In his classic study of the Third Republic, Jacques Chastenet wrote that Ribot, despite the seriousness of the times, entrusted the leadership of the Quai d’Orsay to “obscure Jules Develle.”\(^{43}\) Similarly, Glenn N. Sanderson assumed that Develle was “an obscure figure, who seems nevertheless to have been considerably more combative towards England than his predecessor – perhaps simply because he did less to restrain the traditionally combative tendencies of his officials.”\(^{44}\) From the contemporary reactions in the Chamber, it seems that even Develle’s colleagues were surprised, to say the least, by his nomination to the Quai d’Orsay in 1893; a deputy, Baudry d’Asson, mockingly uttered in the Chamber, that “the ministers of the Third Republic were indeed flexible and ready to accept any portfolio.”\(^{45}\)

As far as Siam was concerned, there was another important gap in Develle’s knowledge, he had “only a very limited understanding of the geography involved,” and this could have contributed to the development of the crisis. While Dean Meyers pointed out that Develle was probably not sure exactly where Paknam and the Bar were, Develle’s actual ignorance was probably even worse. As Dufferin has observed, Develle was not familiar with the geography of Siam in general, which had serious consequences.\(^{46}\) According to Meyers,

> there appears to have been a sort of parallel incapacity existing between the French and British leaders commanding their nations’ foreign policy in Siam. For, Britain’s Foreign Minister, Lord Rosebery, though he was familiar with international politics in Europe and to some extent in Africa, was also well out of his element in Asia.\(^{47}\)

It was this fact that may have caused Rosebery to tacitly recognize France’s claim to the eastern bank of the Menam in March 1893, not realizing how this would complicate not only Anglo-French relations, but also the fate of Siam.\(^{48}\)

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\(^{47}\) Dean Meyers, personal communication, September 20 (2022).

\(^{48}\) Ibid.
How could such an “inexperienced” man hold the post of French Foreign Minister? Develle was no newcomer to politics, but he had never had to deal with the foreign agenda before. This did not make him an exception in the Third Republic, but it involved a considerable risk. As Frederic Schuman has pointed out, “an amateur at the Quai d’Orsay is in a peculiarly difficult position and is probably influenced to a greater degree than his colleagues by the permanent staff of his Ministry.” Given his lack of experience and lack of knowledge of the foreign policy context, Develle probably had to listen to and adopt the views of others who could offer such expertise.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SIAM

In the 1850s, Siam opened up to foreign influences and signed bilateral treaties with France and Great Britain, which were to have unforeseen consequences for its further development. The treaties secured for both France and Britain the right to sail up the Menam River “at least as far as the town of Paknam.” This later played a crucial role in the Paknam Incident. The British, furthermore, received important commercial advantages and, by the end of the 1890s, they accounted for 90 percent of Siamese trade.

In addition, both powers pursued strategic interests in the region. In a wider geopolitical perspective, both powers longed for access to Southern China. The French also saw the gradual penetration of what is now Laos and Cambodia as central to their efforts. In April 1889, William Henry Waddington, the French ambassador to London, proposed the neutralization of Siam to Lord Salisbury, stating that France wished “to establish a strong independent Kingdom of Siam” and desired an arrangement “by which a permanent barrier might be established between the possessions of Great Britain and France.” The proposal was welcomed in London, especially when Waddington assured Salisbury that

49 Keiger, Raymond, 55.
50 Schuman, War and Diplomacy, 30–31.
51 Duke, Les Relations, 2.
54 C. 7395, Siam, No. 1 (1894): Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Siam, London 1894, Salisbury to Lytton, Foreign Office, April 3 (1889), No. 3, 3.
the French in no way intended to annex the province of Luang Prabang. The British were also favorably inclined toward an agreement for the neutralization of Siam, the boundaries of which in the eastern and northeastern directions were to be fixed before proceeding further. This made the French realize that the clarification of the Siamese boundaries could turn out adversely for them. According to Jeshurun, “the French felt it wiser to not to pursue the subject until their own claims in the northern and [sic] northeastern frontiers of Siam were sufficiently strong enough...” Thus, they decided to secure this position.

Later in 1889, France began to invoke the historical rights of Annam and laid claim to the east bank of the Mekong. Auguste Pavie was sent to survey the territory and draw its boundaries. France sought to expand its influence in several ways and Pavie first tried to persuade the Siamese Foreign Minister, Prince Devawong, that France should be granted numerous trade privileges and concessions. This policy of “informal penetration” aimed to “[create] a French commercial and political presence there that would pre-empt the British advance.” When this failed, the French attempted to consolidate their influence in other ways—namely, by pressuring the outlying areas of Siam, including Luang Prabang, whose rulers were to be “induce[d] to seek French protection.”

Although Siam warned that “frontier negotiations could take place only in Bangkok,” in the early 1890s clashes between French and Siamese troops began to proliferate in the border areas. Bangkok then proposed that the dispute be adjudicated by international arbitration, but France refused. Finally, the inability of the British and French to settle their conflicting interests in Siam, together with the change in the political climate in France, led to a more aggressive French policy towards the country. It was under these circumstances that Jules Develle became the French Foreign Minister in January 1893.

57 C. 7395, India Office to Foreign Office, July 24 (1889), No. 7, 8.
58 Jeshurun, The Contest, 6.
59 Brailey, Imperial Amnesia, xix.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 40, 51, 56.
TOWARDS THE “ASIATIC FASHODA”63

The change of French ambitions in the early 1890s was mainly caused by the influence of the parti colonial, which had the support of about one-fifth of the representatives in the French Chamber of Deputies during the period 1889–93.64 With the revival of public interest in colonial affairs and its support, the parti was able to push the government towards a more expansive policy.

In January 1893, Delcassé, who was one of the founding leaders of the groupe colonial in the Chamber, took over as Colonial Undersecretary. The question of French involvement in Siam was then being vigorously debated in the Chamber, with supporters of colonial expansion repeatedly agitating in favor of the acquisition of the east bank of the Mekong. François Deloncle appealed to the Cabinet to finally act against Siam and its encroachment on the French possessions in Indochina and complained that the Siamese ignored the rights of Annam to “all the territories situated between the sea and the left bank of the Mekong River.”65 Delcassé then made a vigorous speech related to French colonial policy in Soudan and Indochina and affirmed the government’s firm commitment to ensuring that the Siamese people respected the rights acquired by France.66 Other members of the parti colonial used appropriate argumentation to ensure that on February 4, 1893, the deputies voted unanimously for the government to provide 180,000 francs to strengthen the security of the French dominions in Indochina and to secure the east bank of the Mekong.67

The month of February 1893 “marked the beginning of organized agitation in the popular Press in France in support of more energetic policy against Siam [...].”68 The French journals Le Matin and Figaro waged an aggressive campaign against Siam. The parti colonial then drafted a petition, signed by 200 members of the Chamber, which was subsequently handed over to Develle. The petition called for swift and decisive action against Bangkok, and the number of signatures was a clear indication of the great influence the parti enjoyed amongst the deputies.69

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63 This term was used by Alfred Vagts, “William II and the Siam Episode,” The American Historical Review 45, no. 4 (1940): 836.
64 Cf. Jeshurun, The Contest, 38; Tuck, French Wolf, 99.
66 Journal des débats, February 5 (1893).
67 Tuck, French Wolf, 104.
68 Jeshurun, The Contest, 40.
Develle was probably surprised by the appeals for a forward policy and the amount of support that the Siamese question received in the Chamber. Delcassé was the one who put the most pressure on Develle personally and on February 4, he wrote to him: “I believe that the time for hesitation is over and that it is time for the court in Bangkok to hear stronger words.”\(^70\) It was also Delcassé who suggested to Develle how the left bank of the Mekong should be defended. Consequently, Develle admitted in a private letter to Pavie “that the Chamber was ‘vivement émue’ and demanded action.”\(^71\)

In this context, the French Cabinet discussed the question in the spring of 1893. The Quai d’Orsay had worked out two possible strategies for how to proceed.\(^72\) The first solution was direct action, “a demonstration by the Chinese squadron at the mouth of the Menam river.”\(^73\) According to the note, this procedure would have had the greatest chance of success; however, it was admitted that the Siamese may try to resist. In that case, it was envisaged that Bangkok would have to be bombarded. The second option was indirect action, which consisted in leaving the government of Siam in a state of uncertainty regarding French intentions for as long as possible. The note then suggested waiting until July to “seize Battambang and Angkor as a reprisal” with the use of indigene forces “and to guard the two provinces as the British guard Egypt.”\(^74\) Finally, it provided for the selection of two reliable officers who would be familiar with the intentions of the government and who would see to it that the left bank of the Mekong was cleared.\(^75\)

Under these circumstances, under pressure from Delcassé, and with the above note in mind, Develle decided to take further steps. France began to increase the pressure on Siam, and shortly thereafter, Siam complained about French encroachments on the left bank of the Middle Mekong between Cambodia and Luang Prabang. Even though the British understood that “the French were working themselves up into the state of excitement against Siam with the view of plundering her,” Rosebery decided not to interfere in the affair. Con-

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\(^{70}\) Cited in Didelot, “Le Maître,” 71.

\(^{71}\) Tuck, French Wolf, 104.

\(^{72}\) AMAE, Papiers d’agents, Archive Privé, fond Paul Révoil (hereafter PAAP149), Note sur les rapports de la France et de Siam, s. l., s. d, f. 28. Presumably, the author was the then governor-general of Indochina, Jean-Marie de Lanessan. Even though the note is undated, it can be assumed to have originated before March 16, 1893. That was when Develle informed Delcassé that he accepted de Lanessan’s proposal, the core of which was “clearing the Siamese garrisons from the east bank of the river by sending expeditions to Strung Treng and Khon[e] on the middle Mekong.” See Tuck, French Wolf, 105.

\(^{73}\) AMAE, PAAP149, Note sur les rapports de la France et de Siam, s. l., s. d, f. 28.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., ff. 28–9.

\(^{75}\) Ibid., f. 29.
sequently, the French got the impression that nothing would stand in the way of their further progress.\textsuperscript{76} According to Meyers, Rosebery sought “the furtherance of Britain’s own essential interests through the maintenance of as stable and peaceful relations with France as possible” and since he did not want to irritate the French, who were re-excited by the British presence in Egypt in 1893, “[he] had given his tacit consent earlier in the year to the French occupation of Siam’s Lao-speaking Left Bank Mekong territories.”\textsuperscript{77}

In early March 1893, Develle received a letter from Charles Le Myre de Vil-ers, the former governor of Cochin China, stating that the British Embassy secretary, Austin Lee, had “categorically confirmed that his government was absolutely disengaged from the question of Siam.”\textsuperscript{78} At the same time, Develle received a report from Bangkok on the state of the Siamese defenses.\textsuperscript{79} This report seems to have relieved him of his last inhibitions. Under these circumstances, therefore, France claimed the clearance of the east bank of the Mekong River. To add gravitas to their request, they dispatched a gunboat called \textit{Lutin} to Bangkok which, on March 14, 1893, docked in Bangkok directly opposite the residence of the King.\textsuperscript{80} Rosebery not only refused to take countermeasures, but also advised Siam to give in to France.\textsuperscript{81} But the Siamese refused the ultimatum. Officially they argued that they were “prepared to abandon any position of territory to which France or Annam may prove prior rights.”\textsuperscript{82} Consequently, the next month witnessed another series of clashes on the east bank of the Mekong River. To bolster their argument, the French decided to occupy Khône island and the area of Strung Treng “as reprisal for the non-evacuation of the military posts in the North.”\textsuperscript{83} Develle acted under the influence of Delcassé and Pavie, who advised him to be uncompromising. When Siam attempted to submit the border disputes to arbitration, Pavie sought to have the \textit{Quai d’Orsay} reject her offer. He deliberately delayed the delivery of the proposal to Develle for seven

\textsuperscript{76}\textit{Cf. DDF X}, Waddington to Develle, London, March 9 (1893), No. 180, 262; Jeshurun, \textit{The Contest}, 45.
\textsuperscript{77} Meyers, \textit{The Paknam Incident}, 3.
\textsuperscript{78} AMAE, Papiers d’agents, Archive Privé, fond Jules Develle (hereafter PAAP35B), Le Myre de Vilers to Develle, March 9 (1893), f. 7.
\textsuperscript{79} Cited by Didelot, “Le Maître,” 83.
\textsuperscript{80} France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, \textit{Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires de Siam} (hereafter DDAS), (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1893), Develle to Le Myre de Vilers, Paris, July 8 (1893), No. 1, 1.
\textsuperscript{81} Cf. C. 7395, Jones to Rosebery, Bangkok, March 10 (1893), No. 27, 19; Ibid., Jones to Rosebery, Bangkok, March 15 (1893), No. 28, 19.
\textsuperscript{82} TNA, FO 17/1177/3, Memoranda of the Correspondence and Communication passed between the French and the Siamese Governments since March 20 (1893) on the Question of the Rectification of the Common Frontier, Annex in Jones to Rosebery, Bangkok, April 19 (1893), f. 136.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., f. 140.
days. Moreover, according to Didelot, Pavie communicated with the Siamese Foreign Minister, Prince Vadhana, on his own, without waiting for instructions from Develle. Ultimately, it was he who contributed to the escalation of the situation.

In May, Siam tried to retake the posts previously occupied by the government of Indochina on the east bank of the Mekong. On May 7, a French Captain, Thoreux, was captured on the island of Khône while transporting ammunition. A few days earlier, there had been another encounter which ended in the deaths of several French soldiers, including two or three officers. These events added the fuel to the smoldering fire, and the French press decided to keep the torch burning. At this stage of the crisis the press and public opinion in France undoubtedly played an important role, for it was impossible for Develle not to act. The French daily newspapers presented the encounter in Siam as the prelude to a decisive contest for primacy in Southeast Asia and appealed to the government “not to allow English influence to prevail in Bangkok.” According to Didelot, “media pressure of this type was constantly exerted on the government, with the press urging it to act before being overwhelmed by the British. These pressures were combined with those of the parti colonial.” Their task had been made easier by the developments in Siam. On June 16, 1893, news reached Paris that in the border region with Siam, in Kieng Kiec, the French Civil Guard inspector Grosgurin and his escort had been massacred after an alleged ambush. As soon as the news leaked to the French press, Develle had to deal with the matter. De Lanessan proposed occupying the islands in the Gulf of Summit and proceeding to occupy Luang Prabang. Pavie encouraged Develle to go even further:

The general opinion of the Europeans is that an extraordinary opportunity is offered to us to put Siam under our Protectorate without anyone protesting; and that if we do not take advantage of it, England, after the affairs have been arranged, will not be in too much of a hurry to take what we have left.

86 Khône was in fact part of the Siamese territory.
90 Tuck, *French Wolf*, 112.
According to Pavie, at the end of June: “The Siamese government still seem[ed] to hope that its attitude and fear of war will reduce our demands.” But given the heated mood in the French capital caused by the previous developments in Siam, the Cabinet decided to take further measures. On 24 June, the ministers agreed to send a squadron to the area and, simultaneously, the garrisons of Indochina were put on war alert. It was evident that the French did not intend to allow the fiasco of 1882 to be repeated, and the Cabinet decided to act. Moreover, in 1893 Lord Cromer faced serious difficulties in Egypt, due to which he took measures that made the French believe that, despite repeated promises, the British were unlikely to abandon Egypt. The crisis was serious, and Rosebery hinted the British were “sitting on a powder magazine,” saying that he wanted to do anything not “to precipitate the explosion.” The French were apparently justified in believing that the British aimed to consolidate their position in Egypt. Thus, not illogically, they were also suspicious of British policy in Siam.

By the end of June, even the British Admiralty was urging the government to send several vessels of its fleet to Bangkok. Their boat Pallas sailed to the shores of Siam from Singapore and was later joined by two other vessels. The Netherlands and Germany subsequently took similar steps. Pavie urged Develle to respond to action previously taken by the British. Delcassé was also alarmed at the situation, recommending to the Cabinet that it should act without delay, for he was deeply concerned that if the French showed restraint, the British would assert themselves in Bangkok. The French feared that Bangkok could have interpreted the arrival of foreign vessels as “an encouragement” for their continued resistance. D’Estournelles told Rosebery, that “everyone in France was convinced” that the British minister in Bangkok “with or without authority, had given advice to the Siamese Government in that direction.”

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92 Ibid., Pavie to Develle, Bangkok, June 24 (1893), f. 140.
93 AMAE, PAAP211/26, Delcassé to Mme Delcassé, June 25 (1893), f. 74; Schuman, War and Diplomacy, 100.
94 Journal officiel, February 3 (1893), 373.
95 TNA, FO 633/114, Cromer Papers: Originals of letters from Secretaries of State. Mainly about policy in Egypt, the Sudan and Abyssinia. Rosebery to Cromer, Foreign Office, March 24 (1893), f. 301.
96 Cf. DDF X, Waddington to Develle, London, January 18 (1893), No. 111, 166; Ibid., Reverseaux de Rouvray to Develle, Cairo, January 14 (1893), Nos. 93–4, 148–50; Ibid., No. 98, 155–56, Ibid., No. 105, 160; Ibid., No. 128, 186.
97 TNA, FO 17/1181/1, Rosebery to Dufferin, London, July 25 (1893), ff. 2–3.
98 Claeys, Delcassé, 95.
99 DDF X, D’Estournelles de Constant to Develle, London, July 3 (1893), No. 281, 412; TNA, FO 17/1179/1, MacGregor to Foreign Office, s. l., July 1 (1893), f. 7 and ff. 8–9; C. 7395, E. Freemantle to Admiralty, Hong Kong, April 12 (1893), No. 35, 23; DDAS, Pavie to Develle, Bangkok, July 9 (1893), No. 3, 3.
then argued it was the “demand of the mercantile community [that] made it impossible for [him] not to send ships to Bangkok.”

These suspicions probably encouraged Develle to move forward. On July 8, he decided to comply with the wishes of Pavie and Delcassé. He insisted, however, that if the Siamese refused to allow their ships into the Menam, Pavie would present a protest to the Court in Bangkok and not resort to forcing entry. Develle’s instructions literally warned Pavie “not to engage in hostilities ... except in the event of our ships being attacked.” When Siam learned two days later that two French gunboats, Inconstante and Comète, would soon arrive in Bangkok, they decided to resist. They might have assumed that London would support them. On July 12, Devawong told Pavie “that Siam intended to respond with force to any attempt by the French ships to enter the Menam, even if they intended to go only as far as they claimed their Treaty Rights automatically permitted them, the town of Paknam.” Paris explained that they had only decided to follow the example of the British and proceed accordingly. When Rosebery learned that “the French Admiral threatens to force an entry into the Menam River,” he immediately warned Jones: “[...] be very careful in your communications with Siamese Gov[ernme]nt. They are citing you in telegrams to their ministers here [in Lon- don] as approving their resolution to resist passage of the French gunboats.”

As for further developments, although he claimed to trust Develle, he confided in Jones: “I am somewhat sceptical as to reality of reported intentions of French. It would be contrary to their promise to give us previous notice before taking any active steps at Bangkok or sending their fleet there.” Jones, however, had to inform him at once that the French had apparently decided “to force declaration of war on the Siamese,” since he had learned from Pavie

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100 TNA, FO 17/1181/1, Rosebery to Dufferin, London, July 25 (1893), f. 3.
102 DDAS, Develle to Pavie, Paris, July 8 (1893), No. 2, 2.
103 Here we encounter a contradiction in British foreign policy. While Rosebery’s official policy and instructions were not to interfere, his predecessor Salisbury saw the matter differently and ordered the British agent Captain Jones to practice a systematic counter-policy which in every way supported the Siamese resistance to French territorial pretensions. Therefore, it was possible that while Constantine Phipps, the representative of the British government in Paris, denied that British agents had given the Siamese monarch any hope in this direction, Jones took a different approach. I want to thank Dean Meyers for bringing this to my attention. Cf. TNA, FO 17/1179/1, Phipps to Foreign Office, Paris, July 1 (1893), f. 1, f. 3; Tuck, French Wolf, 110; Brailey, Imperial Amnesia, 82.
104 Meyers, The Paknam Incident, 8; AMAE, Siam 16, Pavie to Develle, July 16 (1893), f. 265.
105 AMAE, Siam 16, Vadhana to Develle, Paris, July 14 (1893), f. 256.
106 TNA, FO 17/1179/5, Rosebery to Phipps, Foreign Office, July 12 (1893), f. 216.
107 Ibid., Rosebery to Jones, Foreign Office, July 12 (1893), f. 219.
108 Ibid., f. 223.
that “Inconstant will ascend the River to the Capital in spite of opposition.”

Rosebery’s surprise was later confirmed, and apparently, he was not the only one who was surprised. Develle decided to alter the instructions at the very last minute and on July 13, he told Phipps that “he has abandoned intention of sending additional ships to Bangkok. Those sent will remain outside the bar.”

Here lay the core of the problem, because Develle apparently misunderstood the local geography. He seems to have initially believed that the bar was inside the river mouth, just south of Paknam Town. The instructions to Pavie were thus: “As long as no other power has more than one ship on the river, we will not change the situation, but if England brings a new warship to the Menam, Admiral Humman [Humann] will have to bring two immediately.”

Despite the change in Develle’s position, the two French gunboats did enter the river. The Siamese opened fire from the coastal forts and gunboats but both French vessels eventually succeeded in passing through without being seriously damaged and anchored in Bangkok, directly opposite the French Legation. The French now had a strong enough argument with which to force the Siamese to submit to their demands.

When it comes to interpreting who was responsible for the incident, historians disagree. Meyers and Tuck have suggested that the telegraphic message was transmitted 24 hours later, on July 13, only after the Quai d’Orsay became aware of the contradiction between Develle’s understanding of local conditions and the reality enshrined in the treaties of 1856.

Develle then assured London, that on “Wednesday evening, orders were sent to [Admiral Humann] to remain outside bar” and “had apparently not been received.” Develle was not sure what exactly had happened in Siam; thus he sent a very indignant telegram to Pavie, demanding an explanation: “In what way and in what terms did you notify the commander of the Inconstant?” And there seems to be another discrepancy, as Develle was probably not familiar with Asia’s differing time zones. This would explain why he was initially surprised that his commands did not have the desired effect. Even though De-

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109 TNA, FO 17/1179/5, Jones to Foreign Office, Bangkok, July 12 (1893), f. 225.
110 According to Dean Meyers, the message was intentionally not delivered by Pavie. For a more detailed discussion of incident liability, see Meyers, The Paknam Incident, 1–16.
112 Cf. TNA, FO 17/1179/5, Jones to Foreign Office, Bangkok, July 13 (1893), f. 248; Ibid., f. 294; AMAE, Siam 16, Pavie to Develle, July 16 (1893), ff. 265–67; Brailey, Imperial Amnesia, 78; Meyers, The Paknam Incident, 4.
114 TNA, FO 17/1179/5, Phipps to Foreign Office, July 13 (1893), f. 250.
115 TNA, FO 17/1179/5, Phipps to Foreign Office, July 13 (1893), f. 250.
Jules Develle obviously regretted the incident, he concluded that instead of protesting, the Siamese opened fire, thus violating the treaty of 1856. For Develle, Bangkok was to blame. “How does the Minister of Foreign Affairs explain this aggression?” he asked Pavie.\(^{118}\)

Pavie later had to explain to the Quai d’Orsay why the developments in Siam had not been in accordance with Develle’s instructions. Pavie argued that he received Develle’s telegram on the evening of July 14, 1893. He also noted that “At the time of his passage from the bar, Commander [of] Inconstant was in possession of my advice to anchor outside the bar and [that] Siamese were going to defend entering the river.”\(^{119}\) Develle then consulted Delcassé about the issue, and a day later he instructed Pavie to protest the actions leading to the loss of the French pilot boat and demand compensation.\(^{120}\)

Immediately after the incident, Pavie seemed satisfied. He believed that local public opinion favored France and he encouraged Develle to take decisive action: “The Siamese assurances do not deserve confidence, we must not allow time to prepare new pitfalls, it is urgent that you invite me to summon the Siamese government to give us satisfaction without a delay.”\(^{121}\) Based on the information provided by Pavie, Develle believed that the Siamese continued to resist, and he stated that “the delaying tactics used by Bangkok in response to our legitimate demands cannot be tolerated any longer.”\(^{122}\) On July 19, he sent Pavie a list of demands to be submitted to the Devawong if France did not immediately receive compensation for the previous events.\(^{123}\)

THE ULTIMATUM, THE BLOCKADE, AND ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS

As early as July 21, 1893, Pavie presented Devawong with an ultimatum in which Paris demanded not only the cession of all territories on the left bank of the Mekong River, including the islets that were located on the river, but also the evacuation of all Siamese posts on the left bank. Moreover, France required substantial financial compensation for all the previous incidents as well the punishment of the guilty and indemnities for the families of the deceased.\(^{124}\)

\(^{118}\) AMAE, Siam 16, Develle to Pavie, Paris, July 15 (1893), f. 258; TNA, FO 17/1179/5, Phipps to Rosebery, Paris, July 14 (1893), f. 288.

\(^{119}\) AMAE, Siam 16, Pavie to Develle, Bangkok, July 15 (1893), f. 259.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., Develle to Pavie, Paris, July 16 (1893), f. 262.

\(^{121}\) Ibid., Pavie to Develle, Bangkok, July 16 (1893), f. 264.

\(^{122}\) Ibid., Pavie to Develle, Paris, July 16 (1893), f. 264.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., Develle to Pavie, Paris, July 19 (1893), f. 276.

\(^{124}\) Ibid. The posts were to be cleared within a month.
The compensation totaled five million francs. Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, Siam’s General Adviser, who witnessed the communication, was surprised by the amount of compensation required. Pavie criticized the demands, arguing that the territorial requirements presented in the ultimatum were too moderate.

Pavie was requested to leave Bangkok together with all the staff of the French legation if Siam did not accept the ultimatum within 48 hours. Yet, Develle admitted that if France did not receive the compensation and indemnities requested, it would have to take further action. Develle then clarified to Dufferin that as far as Luang Prabang and the adjacent regions were concerned, they perceived them as being the ancient and historic dependencies of Cambodia. Dufferin was shocked, because in 1889 and later in 1892, Waddington had assured him that Luang Prabang was not to be annexed by the French.

It should be mentioned here that as early as March 1893, Delcassé and Lanes-san were discussing the possibilities of France acquiring Battambang and Siem Reap. Delcassé had already announced that “these provinces might be demanded” and that perhaps they could be demanded in exchange for Luang Prabang, whose acquisition he considered a certainty. Once the claim was made, it appeared that the French Foreign Minister did not have the matter firmly in his hands. Dufferin observed that Develle apparently had no precise idea which areas France was claiming. The British were taken by surprise, and once they realized the extent of the French claims, they immediately changed their rhetoric:

Although at the outset of the dispute the English Government had considered the misunderstandings between France and her Siamese neighbour in regard to obscure questions of delimitation on the Lower Mekong as beyond their purview, the situation was entirely changed when the expanding claims of the French Government jeopardized the integrity of the entire Kingdom of Siam, brought France nearly half way down to Bangkok, and into actual juxtaposition with ourselves and [sic] Burmah.

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126 AMAE, Siam 16, Pavie to Develle, Bangkok, July 21 (1893), f. 284.
127 Ibid., Develle to Pavie, Paris, July 19 (1893), f. 277.
129 TNA, FO 17/1180/5, Dufferin to Rosebery, Paris, July 23 (1893), f. 300.
130 Ibid. Luang Prabang and adjacent regions covered an area of 100,000 square miles, equal to nearly a third of the Kingdom of Siam. The British strongly opposed the idea since it would jeopardize the integrity and the independence of Siam.
131 Ibid., f. 301.
Develle then probably realized that the extent of the French claims was larger than he personally would have demanded, but he could not step back without losing face.\textsuperscript{132} When Dufferin suggested France should give assurances to Britain regarding the settlement in Siam, Develle said he could not promise anything without first consulting his experts. Dufferin then noted this observation filled him with “considerable misgivings,” as he was sure Develle meant by “his experts’ Monsieur Delcassé, the Undersecretary for the Colonies.”\textsuperscript{133} Dufferin then tried to undermine Delcassé’s authority and expertise by saying that “subordinates in a public office were often fanatically anxious about special points and were prone to sacrifice the larger interests of their country in pursuit of their own narrower preoccupations.”\textsuperscript{134} He then appealed to Develle that it was “His Excellency who was responsible for the peace of Europe and the world, about which these experts generally cared but little.”\textsuperscript{135} Dufferin’s fear of Delcassé and his influence over Develle was justified, as will be demonstrated later.

At the end of July, D’Estournelles de Constant cabled from London informing Develle about the tense atmosphere and unfriendly attitude of the newspapers regarding the French and Siam.\textsuperscript{136} These were especially caused by the speeches of François Deloncle, who was “spokesman for the territorial claims of Annam and Cambodia.”\textsuperscript{137} On July 26, after the Siamese attempted to refuse the ultimatum, Pavie left Bangkok and Admiral Humann launched a blockade.\textsuperscript{138} The British were extremely concerned about the development. For, just as Lord Curzon and the business circles in the City of London had feared, the French blockade was ultimately not so much to the detriment of the Siamese as it was to the detriment of British trade.\textsuperscript{139} Besides, the idea of France acquiring Luang Prabang was certainly not a pleasant one. As Rosebery noted, “it was really too much,” and as an ideal solution, he proposed not only the neutrality of Siam but also the neutrality of Luang Prabang.\textsuperscript{140}
But the British were also worried about the possibility that France would succeed and turn Siam into a French protectorate. Even the mere acquisition of additional territory by France threatened British interests, for British trade with Siam could be “strangled by heavy duties,” because the “present position gravely endangers British commerce.”¹⁴¹ The Chamber of Commerce in Singapore called for “an immediate strong intervention,” and thus Rosebery was under pressure from all directions.¹⁴²

The blockade caused extreme tension in British-French relations.¹⁴³ Rosebery condemned “the behavior of the French to Siam [as] base, cruel and treacherous.”¹⁴⁴ Indeed, the French had repeatedly assured the Siamese in recent months “that the French Government had no intention of interfering with the independence of Siam,” and Develle had repeatedly confirmed to British representatives in Paris that France had no intention of violating “the integrity of the Siamese Empire.”¹⁴⁵ The severance of diplomatic relations between France and Siam meant only one thing—the threat of an escalation of the dispute and its possible transformation into an armed confrontation. The British seem to have been genuinely concerned about the possibility of war between them and France. They were also aware that in any conflict they would most likely face an alliance between Paris and St. Petersburg, which had already jointly drawn the contours of a treaty of alliance in 1892 (although this was not ratified until late 1893/1894). During a debate in the House of Commons on July 27, 1893, for example, Lord Curzon questioned “whether the blockade instituted by the French on the coast of Siam is a pacific blockade, or is it an act of war […]?”¹⁴⁶

In the meantime, Rosebery tried to probe the German Kaiser’s opinion, because he happened to be visiting Victoria in Cowes on the Isle of Wight. Siam, on the other hand, tried to seek the support and possibly the mediation of the Russian Tsar, who was a friend of King Chulalongkorn.¹⁴⁷ In August 1893, Anglo-French relations were marked by the recent developments. London was concerned about the possibility of an excessive expansion of the French territories. The British were particularly resistant to the French desire for the provinces of Battambang and Angkor, as suggested to Develle by Delcassé, and they recom-

¹⁴¹ TNA, FO 17/1184/1, Telegram by the Chamber of Commerce in Singapore to Lord Rosebery, s. l., September 1 (1893), ff. 3–4.
¹⁴² Ibid.
¹⁴⁵ TNA, FO 17/1179/4, Constantine Phipps to the Earl of Rosebery, Paris, July 5 (1893), f. 162.
¹⁴⁷ Jeshurun, The Contest, 52.
mended that Siam “be alive to the great importance of strictly observing the conditions they have accepted and giving no opportunity for fresh demand.”

Because the blockade, if continued, would have jeopardized their trade and commercial interests, they began to put systematic pressure on Bangkok to come to terms with Paris. Siam was thus caught between two millstones and had no choice but to retreat. On August 3, Bangkok accepted the terms of the ultimatum unconditionally and the blockade ended. Le Myre de Vilers arrived in mid-August and the real negotiations began.

By the treaty of October 3, 1893, the French had not only received a substantial indemnity, but Siam had also renounced all claims to the territory on the left bank of the Mekong. A demilitarized zone of 25 kilometers was created west of the river. In addition, the French, who now controlled the entire strip of territory from Annam to the Mekong, occupied Chantaboun, the second most important port on the Gulf of Siam, which was to serve as a temporary guarantee in case Siam did not fulfil its treaty obligations. The terms of the contract went far beyond the requirements defined by the ultimatum. Although the British protested against the above-mentioned Franco-Siamese agreement of 1893, it had no effect on the validity of the treaty. As a result, British-French relations remained strained at the end of 1893.

DEVELLE VERSUS DELCASSÉ

As far as Siam was concerned, the French Foreign Minister was not at first a proponent of forceful resolution. Unlike Delcassé, who was his advisor, he did not press for the politics of confrontation. Delcassé’s private correspondence shows that from the very beginning of the crisis, he hoped that Siam would lose at least one-third, or ideally one-half, of its territory to French Indochina. According to Andrew, Delcassé “was secretly aiming at nothing short of a French protectorate” and the parti colonial supported him in his efforts. The French Colonial Secretary was then able to use the crisis as a pretext to persuade Develle to push a hard line in the Cabinet.

148 TNA, FO 17/1182/4, Jones to Foreign Office, s. l., August 10 (1893), f. 170.
149 Brailey, *Imperial Amnesia*, 78.
152 AMAE, PAAP211/26, Delcassé to Mme Delcassé, s. l., June 25 (1893), f. 74; Ibid., same to same, s. l., July 1893, f. 77.
At the time of the escalation of the Franco-Siamese crisis, French politicians did not all share these convictions. According to Tuck, Develle was only concerned with controlling the territory east of the Mekong River. The problem was that most probably due to a lack of knowledge, Develle was not sure of the extent of this request. Thus, the French ended up demanding one third of the territory of Siam, which was contradictory to the preservation of Siam as an independent state. Whether or not Develle was aware of this contradiction, his advisor Delcassé certainly knew the true situation. Shortly after the death of Grosgurin, Delcassé outlined in a letter to his wife that the time had come to seize an entire third of Siam. It was evident, therefore, that Grosgurin’s death would serve him as the long-awaited pretext. As soon as it came up, the French Chamber demanded decisive action from the Foreign Minister. Delcassé himself also repeatedly pressured Develle in this regard. Although there was something like a natural animosity between the Quai d’Orsay and the Colonial Undersecretariat, Delcassé was able to exert considerable pressure upon the Foreign Minister. Even though Delcassé was theoretically in a weaker position vis-à-vis the Quai d’Orsay, in the end, he was the one who “pulled the long end of the rope.” It seems that Develle’s inexperience and unfamiliarity with local geography in Asia may have played a role in this regard.

When the crisis in Siam had escalated, Delcassé immediately pressed for decisive action. On June 24, he “suggested to the Council, to the Minister of the Navy, the idea of sending Admiral Human[n], with his squadron, to pay the King of Siam a polite visit to the island of Co-Si-Chong [Koh-Si-Chang], where he [was] in residence.” A few days later, the Cabinet approved sending a French squadron to Bangkok, “to the mouth of the Mei-nam [Menam] river.”

To push his intentions further, Delcassé tried to win the sympathy of the Prime Minister. He persuaded him to call a meeting with the participation of the Foreign Minister Develle and the Minister of Marine, Adrien Barthélemy Louis Henri Rieunier. Delcassé’s intentions were to persuade his colleagues and the Cabinet to adopt a hard line. In a letter to his wife, he threatened:

“If it [my plan] is not definitively adopted, or at least if it is not executed in its essential parts, I shall withdraw. [...] I am convinced, that an energetic speech by

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154 Tuck, French Wolf, 104.
155 TNA, FO 17/1180/5, Dufferin to Rosebery, Paris, July 23 (1893), f. 300.
156 AMAE, PAAP 211/26, Delcassé to Mme Delcassé, s. l., June 25 (1893), ff. 73–74.
157 Tuck, French Wolf, 102.
158 Ibid., 103.
159 AMAE, PAAP 211/26, Delcassé to Mme Delcassé, s. l., July 25 (1893), f. 74.
160 Ibid., same to same, s. l., July 4 (1893), f. 75.
our resident at Bangkok to the King of Siam, showing him the guns of our ships aimed at his palace, will suffice to bring him quickly to composition and England to bow to the fait accompli.”

Another meeting was held on July 17, this time with the participation of the Minister of the Interior, Ribot. Delcassé succeeded in persuading his Cabinet colleagues to accept his plan, an ultimatum accompanied by a blockade. The very next morning, however, the Cabinet met again, and not all colleagues were of the same opinion. Delcassé complained that while Develle was hesitant and Dupuy seemed uncertain, the Minister of War and the Minister of Marine perhaps did not think anything at all. The government finally decided to send an ultimatum, to be followed by a blockade of Bangkok if Siam refused. However, Delcassé was not satisfied because he felt that such a measure was insufficient. He preferred to adopt a hard line: “With a little decision and speed, we could, by showing our cannons, remove everything at once.”

When France presented Siam with the ultimatum on July 21, Delcassé criticized its conditions as too moderate: “The ultimatum is finally gone, modified. They have 48 hours to comply. If they resist, I bet it’s because of the softness of the conditions, which will be blamed on our lack of audacity.” He was outraged that the Cabinet did not respect his recommendations and threatened to resign: “If, contrary to all our warnings, England is allowed to gain a foothold in Bangkok, I shall withdraw quietly, but immediately, not wishing to bear the responsibility for a policy whose deplorable consequences I had announced.” Since it was not long before the elections, this put the government in a difficult position.

As late as July 23, 1893, the Quai d’Orsay had no information about whether Bangkok had agreed to the terms of the ultimatum. A day later, it was clear that this was not the case. Delcassé complained that it was because of “its softness” and the “pieces of advice from [sic] England” that the Siamese decided on “demi-resistance.” He believed that had France adopted more radical rhetoric, the Siamese would have given in and signed anything, even a protectorate treaty, if the French cannons were ready to convince them to do so.

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161 AMAE, PAAP211/26, Delcassé to Mme Delcassé, s. l., July 12 (1893), ff. 78–79.
162 Ibid., same to same, s. l., July 18 (1893), f. 79.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid., same to same, s. l., July 19 (1893), f. 80.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid, same to same, s. l., July 23 (1893), f. 79; Ibid., July 24 (1893), f. 82.
167 Ibid., same to same, s. l., July 24 (1893), f. 82.
On July 26, 1893, Delcassé was determined to take decisive action. He wrote to his wife: “Before I leave, I will give Lanessan orders to occupy the two former Cambodian provinces of Battambang and Angkor. Everything is ready. We don’t need more than six days to move the troops to Battambang. By 10th August, the campaign will be over.” However, at the time, Develle opposed Delcassé’s views. While Delcassé feared that the British would take the opportunity to turn Siam into their own protectorate, the Foreign Minister did not want to escalate the matter. The assurances that Lord Rosebery had repeatedly conveyed to him through British agents in Paris were apparently enough. Develle disagreed with the occupation of Angkor and Battambang and therefore threatened to resign if such an order was issued. For this reason, Delcassé submitted his own resignation. A day later, a compromise was reached at a special Cabinet meeting. Delcassé agreed to withdraw his resignation on the condition that Angkor (Siem Reap) and Battambang would be occupied by France on 1 August if Siam still refused to accept the French ultimatum.

Notwithstanding, Delcassé wanted to have the final word. Therefore, in a personal letter to Dupuy, he appealed that France at least secure a guarantee which it would keep if Siam failed to meet its obligations. This guarantee was to be the port of Chantaboun, whose occupation was finally ordered by Develle on August 3, 1893.

CONCLUSION

Jules Develle was not the right person for the job when he took over the brief of foreign affairs in January 1893. Throughout the Siam crisis, he remained under the influence of experts who were better versed in foreign policy matters than he was. His previous purely domestic political experience left him unprepared for the complex situation he had to face in Asian affairs after becoming Foreign Minister. Thus, he was extremely vulnerable to the ploys and schemes of others, who were talented, unscrupulous, and (unlike him) knowledgeable about local geography and conditions. Among them, Théophile Delcassé and Auguste Pavie were particularly strong. Develle’s ignorance only facilitated their actions. These men often acted contrary to the official instructions of the government (Pavie) or succeeded in setting the course of foreign policy in accordance

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168 Ibid., same to same, Paris, July 26 (1893), f. 82.
169 Ibid.
170 Andrew, Théophile, 33.
171 AMAE, PAAP211/26, Delcassé to Mme Delcassé, Paris, July 31 (1893), f. 84.
with their own ideas (Delcassé). The archival sources available to date have not shown that Develle was in any way influenced by his close associates from the Quai d’Orsay, Paul Révoile and Armand Nissard, on the Siam question.

Develle’s position was further weakened by the fact that he had no ties to the press or to pressure groups and he was surrounded by people who, in turn, had close ties to the parti colonial. Therefore, Jeshurun was justified in stating that Develle was “unusually weak.”\(^{172}\) During the crisis, Develle repeatedly faced pressure from Théophile Delcassé and Auguste Pavie, who called for an uncompromising approach towards the oriental kingdom. Under pressure from the Chamber and the press, Develle often adopted their positions. It was Develle’s ignorance of the geographical conditions in Siam that contributed substantially to the Paknam Incident. Eventually, he could no longer be sure that his subordinates (particularly Pavie) would act in accordance with his instructions, and they took advantage of their superior’s ignorance to shape developments in Siam to their liking.

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